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ABSTRACT 
 
Secondary markets have adopted a number of quality signaling mechanisms such as certification to reduce 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers in these markets. However the importance and value of 
these signals depends on the nature and extent of information asymmetries. With the growth of the Internet, 
consumers seeking to purchase used goods now have access to a plethora of information on various aspects 
of their purchase process. What then is the impact of such information on the salience and value of a traditional 
quality signal such as certification?  We draw upon a unique and extensive dataset of consumers who obtained 
vehicle and transaction related information from online sources in their used vehicle purchase process to 
examine the impact of their information-acquisition on the choice of certification, as well as the price paid.  We 
compare the outcomes of sales where consumers purchased certified used cars with sales of used-cars where 
there was no certification. Our findings highlight that product-related information substitutes, and price-related 
information complements, certification as indicated by their differential impacts on demand and price of certified 
used cars. We discuss the relevance of our findings for buyers and sellers and outline implications for online 
information providers as well.  
Keywords: certification, online information, quality signals, uncertainty reduction, used cars 
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 Introduction 
Most markets are characterized by significant information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, with sellers 
possessing superior information to buyers about the true quality of their offerings. As noted in the seminal paper 
by Akerlof (1970), when buyers lack adequate information to distinguish higher quality from lower quality 
products, sellers of low quality products have an incentive to misrepresent the quality of their offerings leading 
eventually to a market collapse. To avoid such a collapse, markets characterized by information asymmetries, 
particularly markets for used goods, have resorted to quality-signaling mechanisms such as certification that 
can help reduce friction in these markets. While such quality signaling mechanisms are valuable to both buyers 
and sellers in such markets, their value to consumers, and the competitive advantage they provide to sellers, 
depends crucially on the nature and extent of the information asymmetries in these markets. As noted by Folta 
and Janney (2004), signaling mechanisms are more valuable and result in higher returns when buyers face 
greater difficulty in acquiring information about underlying product attributes.  
Over the recent years the growth of the Internet has dramatically increased the availability of information to 
prospective buyers across a number of markets. Consumers now, have access to a wide range of information 
regarding products, services, and alternatives, to make purchase decisions. Such information can potentially 
help bridge the information gap between buyers and sellers, and significantly reduce the information 
asymmetries in these markets. The abundance of information available through various online sources brings to 
fore questions regarding the salience and value of conventional quality signaling mechanisms such as 
certification. For instance, are consumers more likely to purchase certification if they have more information? 
Does certification command a higher premium when consumers have more information? Do consumers who 
obtain certain types of information pay lower prices than others for their purchases? The used-car market 
provides an excellent test-bed to examine these questions, and is one that provides the context for our study. 
Given the complexity of the offerings and the difficulty in determining quality, certification, in particular, plays a 
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very important role in reducing the frictions inherent in the market for used cars. While certification has 
traditionally been valuable to buyers as well as sellers of used cars, the growth of the Internet, and the 
emergence of auto-retailing websites in particular, has dramatically increased the amount of information 
available to consumers seeking to purchase used cars. The changing landscape of used vehicle markets 
makes it an ideal setting to understand the impact of online information on the value of certification – an issue 
that would be of considerable interest to academicians as well as practitioners.  
We draw upon a unique and extensive dataset of consumers who obtained vehicle and transaction related 
information from online information sources in their used vehicle purchase process to examine the impact of 
their information acquisition on their choice of certified used cars, as well as the price paid. We compare the 
outcomes of sales where consumers purchased certified used cars with sales of used-cars where there was no 
certification, after controlling for a number of individual, and vehicle characteristics. Four different types of 
online information are found to be salient for buyers of used cars. Interestingly, each of them impacts the value 
of certification in different ways, as evidenced by their effects on consumers’ choice (demand) and price. While 
prior empirical research has largely ignored the extent of information asymmetry in the markets for used goods, 
we show that the increased availability of different types of online information has a significant impact on 
consumers’ choice of certified versus non-certified used cars as well as the price paid. A key implication then is 
that, as long as the cost of providing different categories of information is low, online infomediaries have 
important consequences for buyer and seller outcomes in traditional markets for used goods. We discuss the 
relevance of our findings for buyers and sellers in secondary markets, as well as for online infomediaries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the context of our study as 
well as the increasing importance of online information in the market for used cars. We then provide a brief 
overview of related research followed by a description of the data and measures used in the study. We then 
present the details of the empirical analyses, and the results of our study. We then discuss the findings and 
their managerial implications. The final section contains concluding remarks.    
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Research Context 
The used car market has been growing at a phenomenal pace. While 13.6 million new vehicles were purchased 
in North America in 2004, the corresponding numbers for used vehicles was 42.5 million—representing a 12% 
increase over 20032. The used-car market is a classic example of a “lemons” market (Akerlof 1970) where 
sellers have private information about the quality of their offerings, while buyers are unable to assess quality 
with certainty. In order to overcome a potential market breakdown, sellers resort to different mechanisms to 
signal the quality of their products – certification, being the most common among them. Certification of used 
cars emerged as a byproduct of leasing in the late 1980s and 1990s, as luxury car manufacturers and dealers 
sought to resell the vehicles whose lease period had ended.  Certification usually implies that the certified 
vehicle has been put through a comprehensive inspection process—anywhere from a 100-point to 300-point 
inspection and reconditioning3. Certified pre-owned vehicles have increasingly become an important category 
of vehicle purchases over the last decade. A J. D. Power and Associates study (2005) found that certified used 
cars accounted for 41% of all used-car dealership sales in 2005, up from 38% in 2004.  
In the market for used cars, certification can potentially alleviate the problems of adverse selection by 
acting as a reliable signal of product quality. However, an interesting and crucial aspect of certification in this 
market is that, unlike situations where certification is generally provided by third-parties, certification of used 
cars is typically backed by the manufacturer, but ultimately provided by the sellers themselves (also known as 
first-party certification (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser 2001)). Certified used cars typically sell for a 
premium over uncertified ones, and despite their growing popularity there have been several criticisms of these 
certification programs (Cutler 2005). Whether certified used vehicles offer value to consumers remains an 
                                                 
2 Source: Manheim, Used Car Market Report, (Atlanta, GA),  http://www.manheimnews.com/UCMR/reports/ManheimUCMR2005-
4uN73r/ dt. 3/3/05). 
3 According to the National Automobile Dealers’ Association (NADA), the term “certified” involves six categories of inspections: 
General evaluation; Under-hood evaluation; Exterior assessment; Interior evaluation; Required service and maintenance assessment; 
and Exterior detailing analysis. 
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empirical question that needs to be validated – a question that takes on added significance with the increasing 
availability of online information. 
As noted earlier, the growth of the Internet and online information intermediaries has had a big impact on 
auto-retailing and how consumers shop for vehicles. Car buyers now have access to several resources 
including car-buying guides, car make-model and pricing information, pictures, reliability and safety information. 
According to a recent AutoShopper.com study by J. D. Power and Associates, 80% of used car buyers have 
access to the Internet, and 59% of the buyers used the Internet during their buying process in 2006. The 
growing popularity of online information is also demonstrated by the fact that in 2004, for the first time, more 
than twice as many late-model used vehicle buyers found the vehicle they purchased through the Internet than 
both newspaper and magazine classified ads combined (J. D.Power and Associates, 2006). Obtaining 
information can help consumers bridge their informational gaps by learning about the vehicles price across 
dealers, the used car details, its attributes (for e.g., known defects and issues for its vehicle class), its history, 
the available alternatives, as well as the details of certification, and warranties offered. Given that potential 
buyers can acquire relevant information from online sources to reduce the information asymmetry they face, it 
is important to assess whether such online information serves as a complement or substitute to the traditional 
certification mechanism common in secondary markets. However, the impact of these variables on consumer 
choices and market outcomes has not been examined before. 
An Overview of Related Research 
Certification: A well-established stream of analytical research examines certification (Lizzeri 1999), and its role 
as an effective quality signaling mechanism. However, there exist very few empirical studies that have 
examined the outcomes of such mechanisms for firms and consumers. In markets with information asymmetry 
such as bond ratings, insurance, comics, sports cards trading, and used goods, certification has been shown to 
be a particularly valuable signal. In addition to helping reduce buyer’s information asymmetry, certification 
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generates new information for all market players (Jin, Kato, and List 2006). By helping reduce search costs for 
customers seeking credible suppliers, certification also helps increase demand from buyers who otherwise may 
have not entered the market (Tirole 1988). Finally, certification can also help provide sellers with information on 
buyer’s unobservable characteristics such as risk aversion (Ippolito and Mathios 1990; Jin and Leslie 2003). 
Prior empirical work finds mixed evidence of the effects of certification on market outcomes. Some studies 
document a positive relationship between certification and price and/or quality in thoroughbred racehorses 
(Wimmer and Chezum 2003), ISO9000 certified manufacturing programs (Terlaak and King 2006), collectible 
stamps (Dewan and Hsu 2004), and sports cards (Jin and Kato (forthcoming)). In contrast, a study (Kleiner and 
Kudrle 2000) examining the role of occupational licensing in dental health services, finds that while tougher 
licensing does raise prices, they do not improve outcomes for consumers. Most of this existing work focuses on 
certification by independent third-parties rather than first-party certification, which is the case in the market for 
used vehicles. In one of the few studies examining mandatory certification of used cars, Pratt and Hoffer (1985) 
find that in states that mandated “quality certification”, the quality of vehicles traded were not significantly 
different than in those states without such laws. Ginter, Young and Dickson (1987) find that the depreciation, 
and also markup, is independent of reliability (quality) performance of vehicles in the used car market. 
A few studies have also examined the role of alternate information-asymmetry reduction mechanisms in 
secondary markets. For instance, prior research has examined the impact of reputation on price-related 
outcomes, and broadly found a positive relationship between the reputation of the seller and the resulting price 
of the transaction (Resnick et al. 2006; Dewan and Hsu 2004). In a recent study, Dewally and Ederington 
(2006) compare different quality signals in the market for comic-books, and find that certification sends the 
strongest signal, with certified books averaging a premium of 50% over uncertified ones. The findings of these 
studies more generally suggest that when alternative information sources or signals are available in markets 
with information asymmetries, the diagnosticity of a quality-signaling mechanism such as certification depends 
on the valence of these other signals in the environment (Purohit and Srivastava 2001). While our study 
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controls for alternate information-asymmetry reduction mechanisms such as additional warranties, the primary 
focus of our study is on understanding the impact of online information availability on the value of certification in 
secondary markets. In contrast to the earlier studies that focus on the role of certification or price-related 
outcomes within secondary markets, our study is motivated by the belief that the dramatic increase in the 
volume and variety of online information calls for a re-examination of the value of certification to consumers.  
Information Search: A number of studies in marketing and economics have examined consumers' 
information seeking behaviors (Beatty and Smith 1987; Kiel and Layton 1981, Moorman et al. 2004; Schmidt 
and Spreng 1996). Broadly, these studies have identified a number of factors including, buyer characteristics, 
situational, and environmental variables, as influencing buyers’ information seeking behaviors. A few studies 
have also examined information search within the context of purchase of new automobiles (Furse, Punj and 
Stewart 1984; Klein and Ford 2003; Moorthy, Ratchford and Talukdar 1997; Punj and Staelin 1983; Ratchford, 
Lee and Talukdar 2003; Srinivasan and Ratchford 1993). While an extensive review of this research-stream is 
beyond the scope of our paper, what is most relevant to our study is research examining consumers' 
information search in secondary markets. Given the heightened nature of risk faced by buyers in these markets, 
information search has been found to be a dominant risk reduction strategy (Gabbott 1991). In examining the 
different types of uncertainties, Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie (1989) find that information search is impacted by 
two types of uncertainties – knowledge uncertainty specific to a particular alternative, and choice uncertainty 
related to choice among competing alternatives, while Choudhuri (2000) finds that performance risk, and 
financial  risk, affect information search as well. Researchers also find that buyers search and obtain more 
information from varied sources to reduce uncertainty related to the product, and the transaction prices (Cox 
1967; Dowling and Staelin 1994; Srinivasan and Ratchford 1993).  
More recently, researchers have sought to understand consumers’ online information seeking behaviors 
(e.g., Johnson et al. 2004, Klein and Ford 2003), and the impact of online information on market outcomes 
(e.g., Hodkinson and Keil 2003, Zettelmeyer et al. 2005). Studies examining the impact of online information on 
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market outcomes find important differences in the outcomes resulting from the acquisition of price vis-à-vis 
product information (for instance, Diehl, Kornish and Lynch 2003; Lynch and Ariely 2000).  Studies examining 
the impact of online price information find that providing price information leads to more competitive pricing by 
firms and lower average prices for consumers (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Baye and Morgan 2001, Baye, 
Morgan and Scholten 2003, Chen, Iyer and Padmanabhan 2002).  In contrast, research examining the role of 
product-related information finds that customers are less price-sensitive when provided with product quality 
information (Alba et al. 1997, Lynch and Ariely 2000).  Together, these findings suggest that an examination of 
the search process must take into account the type of information obtained during the search process.         
While most of these studies examine the impacts of online information on consumer outcomes in primary 
(new-product) markets, our study extends this stream of research by analyzing the impact of online information 
on outcomes in secondary markets. Moreover, much of the existing literature that examines the impacts of a 
focal information source (online information) on the choice and use of other media treats the Internet as an 
aggregate or monolithic source of information. However, it is clear that consumers can obtain several 
dimensions of online information related to purchasing a (used) product, each of which can have different 
impacts on outcomes in the market. Further, they fall short of assessing how online information interacts with 
alternate mechanisms such as certification to affect market outcomes. Our study seeks to fill these gaps. 
Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 
We propose a simple research framework to investigate the impact of online information in secondary markets, 
particularly in the market for used cars, and posit hypotheses relating information acquisition to consumers’ 
choice of certified vehicle purchase, and price paid.  
Online Information Dimensions Salient to Used Vehicle Purchase 
As noted earlier, most of the research on the impact of online information has focused on the impact of price-
related information on market outcomes. For instance, in the automobile industry, Zettelmeyer et al. (2005) find 
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that new vehicle buyers who use the Internet pay 2.2% less for their car than those who do not use it, to obtain 
a savings of $500 on the average car. In the insurance industry, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) show that the 
growth of the Internet has reduced the price of term life insurance by 8%–15%. More recently, Zettelmeyer, 
Scott Morton and Silva-Risso (2006) demonstrate that the savings in car markets arise primarily through two 
means—by informing consumers of dealer invoice prices, and by providing buyers with online buying services 
that obtain attractive rates by aggregating demand across dispersed buyers.  
In addition to price information, a few studies have also examined the impact of product-related information 
obtained by consumers from online sources. Ratchford et al. (2003) for instance, examine the role of the 
Internet as a source of product-related information, and how it impacts consumers’ use of other conventional 
sources of information (such as TV and print) and their total search effort in the purchase of new automobiles. 
In a recent study of online auto-retailing, Viswanathan et al. (2007) find that consumers using online auto-
retailing intermediaries obtain price and product related information, each of which has a differential impact on 
outcomes such as buyer’s willingness to pay, market prices, and customer satisfaction. Other studies have also 
found that the availability of product information was found to increase buyers’ willingness-to-pay by providing 
buyers with a product of better fit (Lynch and Ariely 2000); while access to price-information tended to reduce 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay (Diehl et al. 2003). 
Building on this past research, we construct a typology of information needs specifically relevant to the 
purchase of used goods. We map the product and price-related information dimensions identified in earlier 
research to product-features and transaction price related information. Product-features and transaction price 
information assume greater importance in the market for used goods as each used-good is unique and 
differentiated from others. In addition, compared to the new product purchases, consumers seeking to purchase 
used goods are faced with uncertainty about the performance of the product and the value of their purchase. 
Consequently, information that can help reduce uncertainty/risk related to the product quality (performance) and 
information that can help reduce uncertainty about the value (price) of the used good would be very valuable to 
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consumers. Since the purchase a used good is typically framed against the alternative of buying a new good, 
quality and price of the new good serve as critical reference points. Thus, the buyer needs to obtain (product 
and price) information not only about used goods, but also product and price-related information about new 
alternatives that may serve as close substitutes. These two additional information-needs lead us to propose a 
taxonomy consisting of four broad information needs specific to the used vehicle context. 
Information buyers obtain from online search is therefore, categorized into product-related information 
including vehicle features and vehicle reliability, and price-related information on transaction, and comparative 
alternatives. Examining how each of these categories of online information substitutes or complements 
“information” provided by traditional certification forms a key focus of our study. In particular we are interested 
in examining if the acquisition of online information by consumers increases the value of certification. From an 
individual customer’s perspective, online information could lead to an increase/decrease in the likelihood of 
purchasing a certified used car, and/or increase/decrease the willingness-to-pay for a certified used car, 
compared to its uncertified counterpart. In other words, an increase in the value of certification could manifest 
as either an increase in the demand for certified used cars or an increase in the price of certified used cars or 
both. In the following section we develop hypotheses relating the impact of the four different types of online 
information to the choice of certification as well as price-related outcomes. 
Hypotheses 
Certification acts as a signal for quality and therefore a buyer may be expected to be willing to pay a higher 
price for certified vehicles. On the other hand, certification in the case of used cars is provided by dealers 
themselves and hence might also be perceived as lacking in real value. The value of certification for used cars 
is thus an empirical question and one that we test in our first hypothesis, which posits that: 
H1. The price paid will be higher for purchase of a certified vehicle. 
In the market for used vehicles, certification serves mainly as a signal of quality, but can also provide 
information to the consumers about the condition of the used vehicle, including all repairs and maintenance 
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services that were performed upon the vehicle to guarantee a minimum standard of quality. As a signal of 
quality, certification is most closely associated with aiding in the reduction of uncertainty related to the quality 
and performance of the used vehicle. Reliability-related information helps to decrease performance uncertainty 
associated with the product (Kaplan, Szybillo, and Jacoby 1974), and is therefore expected to lower the value 
for certification. This lower value for certification could manifest itself as a lower demand for certified used cars 
and/or a lower price (or willingness to pay WTP) for a certified used car. Thus we posit that: 
H2a. Greater product Reliability information obtained by a buyer will reduce the likelihood of purchasing a 
certified vehicle. 
 
H2b. Greater product Reliability information obtained by a buyer will decrease the price paid by the buyer for a 
certified vehicle. 
As above, product features-related information is likely to have a similar impact to reliability information on 
consumers’ choice of certification and price paid. As described in Markopoulos et al. (2004), many markets face 
an information deficit, where in spite of the greater technological advancements and ease of providing 
information online, consumers continue to be imperfectly informed about product attributes due to the lack of 
sufficient information. Further, such information is shown to have key impacts on consumer outcomes by 
helping consumers gather better information about products before purchase, and also allowing them to 
efficiently search large and complicated product spaces according to their own personal needs and 
preferences, thereby mitigating knowledge uncertainty (Urbany et al. 1986). Thus, we expect that the retrieval 
of greater features-related information will reduce the buyer’s sensitivity to quality issues and result in a lower 
value for certified used vehicles. As earlier, this lower value for certification could manifest itself as a lower 
demand for certified used cars and/or a lower price (WTP) for certified used cars. Thus we posit that: 
H3a. Greater product Features information obtained by a buyer will reduce the likelihood of purchasing a 
certified used vehicle. 
 
H3b. Greater product Features information obtained by a buyer will decrease the price paid by the buyer for 
certified used vehicles. 
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Armed with greater information about financing offers and discounts available for the vehicles, consumers are 
in a position to better understand the total financial costs of owning the car, reducing their financial/ economic 
uncertainty (Kaplan et al. 1974). Obtaining transactional price-related information may increase the consumers’ 
perception of savings from making a purchase, and free up resources that can be invested in other affordable 
and useful add-ons, such as certification. In addition, consumers who obtain information about the costs of 
certification and additional warranties available for the vehicles obtain greater information about the value and 
benefits of certification. Hence, consumers who obtain transaction-related information are likely to perceive a 
greater value in certification.  This higher value for certification could manifest itself as a higher demand for 
certified used cars and/or a higher price (WTP) for certified used cars. Thus we posit that: 
H4a. Greater Transaction price information obtained by a buyer will increase the likelihood of purchasing a 
certified vehicle. 
 
H4b. Greater Transaction price information obtained by a buyer will increase the price paid by the buyer for a 
certified vehicle. 
Certified used vehicles are seen as a close substitute to new vehicles. In particular, certification is perceived to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with used vehicles making them closer to new vehicles. More importantly, 
certified used vehicles are seen as better alternatives to new vehicles as they are priced lower than new 
vehicles. Hence, consumers who obtain comparative information about new vehicle prices are likely to perceive 
lower choice uncertainty, as well as lower economic uncertainty about the value of their purchase, and 
consequently, greater value in certification. This higher value for certification could manifest itself as a higher 
demand for certified used cars and/or a higher price (WTP) for certified used cars. Thus we posit that: 
H5a. Greater Comparative price information obtained by a buyer will increase the likelihood of purchasing a 
certified vehicle. 
 
H5b. Greater Comparative price information obtained by a buyer will increase the price paid by the buyer for a 
certified vehicle. 
Data and Measures 
Data 
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Our study is based on secondary data obtained from a survey of 1999 to 2004 model-year used vehicle buyers, 
conducted by one of the largest market-research organizations in the US. The quota sampling strategy was 
designed to ensure that sufficient sample size was obtained for car make analysis, including a return of a 
minimum of 125 in-line4, certified returns for those car nameplates with certification programs, and a minimum 
of 120 responses from buyers who used the Internet for their automotive shopping for nameplates without 
certification programs. Two versions of an eight-page questionnaire (differentiated by rotating question items) 
and a cover letter along with a $1 incentive were sent out in late January 2004 and a reminder postcard was 
mailed about a week later. Out of the total mail-out to a randomized sample of 78,534 buyers, 12,142 
completed surveys were returned resulting in a response rate of 15.5%. The dataset consists of both 
consumers who used the Internet as part of their purchase process and traditional consumers (who did not use 
the Internet to shop for their used vehicle). Sampling weights based on a sales-weighting process are used to 
ensure that the distribution of makes in the sample was representative of the total personal use registrations of 
vehicles completed in the sampling period. 
For the purpose of this study, we follow Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) in defining a “car” as the “interaction of 
make, model, body type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level” (p.170). To adequately 
control for vehicle fixed effects, we restrict our analysis to the top 135 Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs), 
each of which had at least 25 responses or vehicle purchases.  Thus our resulting sample consisted of a total of 
5,349 vehicle purchases. We further restrict our sample to those make-model combinations which have both 
certified and non-certified sales in our data5. This restricted sample of 3,823 vehicles helps us achieve quasi-
experimental control, and the various additional controls including vehicle and buyer characteristics among 
others, allows us to isolate the impact of online information.  
                                                 
4 In-line refers to the fact that the dealer buyers bought from sold used and new vehicles of the same make. 
5 This reduction in the observations led us to drop 68 luxury and 419 non-luxury purchases of 10 “cars”, and observations with missing 
values. The average price of each segment rose slightly from $23,205.36 to $23,767.23 and from $12,748.36 to $12,788.98, 
respectively. The proportion of Internet users and online information found is not significantly different across the new and old sample. 
The restricted sample has a marginally lower proportion of certified purchases (33.09% vs. 33.78%).  
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57% of the consumers in our sample are male with median age of 51 years, while median age for females 
was 46 years. Racial minorities (African Americans and Hispanics) constitute 7.8% and buyers with low 
education (high school and below) constitute 24.0% of the sample. Buyers in our study have several options 
from where to purchase the used vehicle. A majority of the purchases in our sample were made at new car 
dealerships (63.12%), followed by used car dealers (20.73%), the rest being private sellers, and rental car 
companies. Our sample of respondents provided detailed information on their beliefs and use of used vehicle 
certification programs. 33.0 % purchased a certified used vehicle, and 3.8% had previously owned a certified 
used car. We obtain detailed information on buyers’ online and offline information search processes. More than 
half of the buyers (56.3% of the sample) report using the Internet to help shop for their used vehicle, and spent 
an average of 6 hours doing so. 77% of the internet users conducted online research, on average, 6 weeks 
prior to visiting physical dealer locations. Those who visited online sites post dealer visits do so after 2 weeks, 
on average. Our sample of Internet buyers visited on average 3.38 third-party websites, 2.45 manufacturer 
websites (MFG), 3.24 dealership websites, 0.57 newspaper sites, and 0.09 chatroom/bulletin board sites. 
Measures 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables used in our empirical analyses. Our primary outcome variables are 
the buyer’s choice of certification and the price paid for the used vehicle. Certification is measured as a binary 
variable, while Price is a continuous variable measured in dollars. The rest of the independent variables are 
measured as follows. Information buyers obtain from online search are categorized into product-related 
information about vehicle reliability, and features, and price-related information about transaction and 
comparative options. Vehicle Reliability information includes the historical performance of the make-model, 
vehicle reviews, safety and crash test ratings, and its road-handling abilities. Vehicle features includes 
information on specifications, access to vehicle photographs, and tools for comparing available features across 
different vehicle make-models. Transaction information includes information on special offers, discounts and 
financing options, along with warranty options and certification programs available on the vehicle that are of 
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interest to a potential used vehicle buyer. Comparative information includes prices of alternate options available 
to the potential buyer such as new vehicles and trade-in values. Buyers report about the various types of 
information found by them during their online search process. These are shown in Table 2.  In order to extract 
the underlying information constructs, while reducing the number of parameters in our model, we employ 
Principal Component factor analysis with varimax rotation to obtain bundles of related information found by our 
buyers. Our four-factor model summarily captures the multi-faceted information structure (explains 74.61% 
variance in the items), and as shown in Table 2, exhibits reliability in an acceptable range from 0.68 to 0.72 for 
three of the factors, with Comparatives information displaying a marginal reliability of 0.59. Majority of the 
loadings are above 0.60 with the exception of tools for calculating monthly payments (0.53 on Transaction) and 
trade-in values (0.56 on Comparatives). 
The dataset includes vehicle characteristics such as Mileage, Model year, and whether the vehicle was a 
Luxury make. We also include 125 dummies to represent the used-car make-model-trim feature combination as 
described earlier. The dataset also contains information on buyer demographics including Gender, Age, 
Income, Low Education, Minority Race and Marital Status. We control for buyer’s purchase intentions using 
Want Used, a binary that indicates whether the buyer specifically only wanted to purchase a used vehicle, and 
buyer’s experience with used cars- Experience Used - which is equal to 1 if the previously owned car was used.  
Additional controls include buyer’s access and use of offline information. We consider two such sources- 
use of Offline classifieds/ads in newspapers, TV and magazines (Offline Ads), and use of recommendations 
from friends, relatives and/or own personal experience to search and locate the seller/purchased vehicle 
(Offline Personal). We also control for the characteristics of the market and the type of seller. Market 
characteristics include dummies for Metro, Small, or Rural markets - the type of market where the car was 
purchased, and the seller type indicates whether the car was purchased from a new car dealer, a used car 
dealer, or other. Two variables allow us to control for the quality of the car in determining the effect of 
certification and information on the price paid. The first is a measure of buyer’s overall Satisfaction with the 
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vehicle (scaled from 1 to 10), and the second, the NumProblems (number of problems) encountered in the 
vehicle within three months of purchase. These variables act as a proxy for the unobserved car quality. Finally, 
Addwarranty, equal to 1 if a buyer purchased any seller-provided additional warranty protection and 0 
otherwise6. All interaction terms are formed after centering to reduce multicollinearity. 
Empirical Analyses 
Model specification 
We specify the following econometric model to assess consumers’ acquisition of the four types of online 
information, their choice of certification, and the price they pay for their used vehicle. The price equation is 
specified in [1], and the certification choice equation is given in [2]. The information choice equation is specified 
in [3] for the four different types of information (i =Features, Reliability, Transaction, Comparative).  
[1] PRICE = α1 + β1 VEHICLE + γ1 BUYER + η1 CERTIFICATION + ∑δ1i INFORMATIONi + θ1 INTERACTIONS  
+ ζ1 CONTROLS_P + ε1 
[2] CERTIFICATION = α2 + β2 VEHICLE + γ2 BUYER + η2 PRICE + ∑δ2i INFORMATIONi + ζ2 CONTROLS_C + φZ2 + ε2 
 [3] INFORMATIONi = α3i + β3i VEHICLE + γ3i BUYER + ζ3i CONTROLS_I + φ3i Z3 + ε3i 
 In equations [1] - [3], we include a vector of common Vehicle and Buyer variables as described above. 
Certification is a binary variable indicating whether the buyer purchased a certified used vehicle. The 
Interactions vector is a set of cross products between Certification and the four Information factors, and the two 
interactions of Certification with Mileage and Luxury make, to capture the differential impacts of certification 
across high mileage and luxury cars. Finally, we include several controls in the three equations. Controls_P and 
Controls_C includes Offline Ads, Offline Personal, vehicle quality (Satisfaction, and NumProblems), Market size 
(small, metro), type of seller vehicle was purchased from (new car dealer, used car dealer), and Addwarranty. 
Controls_I contains controls for offline information search- Offline Ads and Offline Personal. Since equations [1] 
                                                 
6 Additional warranty refers to any extended coverage (e.g., bumper to bumper or powertrain) purchased from the dealer/seller that is 
not included with certification.  
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-[3] constitute a system of simultaneous equations, we also include a vector of instruments Z2 in [2] and Z3 in 
[3] to enable estimation of endogenous variables. These are discussed below. 
Estimation Procedures 
The above system of equations highlights several concerns that arise in the process of estimating the impact of 
online information on the outcomes of interest. 
Treatment bias: The first concern arises from the possibility of the existence of treatment bias (Heckman 
1979), where non-random self-selection into treatment conditions (here, the choice of certification) in the 
sample leads to biased estimates if ignored. In our sample, treatment bias may arise from either demand or 
supply sources. Non-random self-selection of buyers that purchase certified vehicles occurs when unobserved 
variables that lead buyers to purchase certification also lead them to systematically obtain higher or lower 
prices. For instance, risk averse, low-income buyers would be more likely to buy certified used cars but also 
pay lower prices on an average, compared to high-income buyers. If this were the case, then the coefficient of 
Certification in equation [1] would be under-/over-estimated as it captures not only the effect of certification, but 
also of the correlated unobservables on price.  We simultaneously estimate the price-certification equations 
using maximum likelihood estimation, along with an exclusion restriction (Shop Certified) that helps to robustly 
identify the model, and reduces our reliance on the functional form of the equations for identification. The 
results of a Likelihood ratio test suggest that treatment bias is not an issue for Certification.7 
Second, there may be non-randomness in the vehicles that are chosen to be certified by the seller.  Sellers 
may selectively choose to certificate certain types of vehicles (e.g., newer-model, low mileage, and luxury 
makes) that are more profitable to sell as certified, thereby upwardly biasing the coefficient of certification on 
price that is derived without accounting for selection of vehicles. The coefficient between Price and Certification 
                                                 
7 These results are not shown here for sake of brevity, but are available from the authors. 
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in our sample is 0.17(p<0.01), suggesting either that higher value cars are certified, or alternatively, that 
certified cars sell for more. We deal with this issue by adding Price as an explanatory variable in 2].  
Error covariance: A second concern relates to the possibility of contemporaneous or cross-equation error 
covariance across choice in [2] and [3] and price outcome in [1], indicating that common unobservables 
influence information acquisition, choice of certification and price.8 Another related issue arises from the 
presence of a common subset of right hand side regressors- Vehicle and Buyer characteristics. These 
problems could potentially confound the parameters of interest.  
Endogeneity: Additionally, OLS assumptions may be violated due to the presence of first, non-recursive 
endogeneity between the choice of certification model and the outcome model, since certification and price are 
reciprocally causal, and second, recursive endogenity between online information and price. It is therefore 
necessary to account for the resulting confounding using appropriate instrumental variable estimation methods 
described in Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003).  
We therefore utilize a full information estimation technique (3SLS) that takes into account both the effects 
of cross-equation error covariance and endogeneity by combining 2SLS and SUR.9 In our 3SLS model, we 
treat certification and online information as endogenous in the price equation [1], and additionally, online 
information and price as endogenous in the certification equation [2].  
Identification: We specify the following instrumental variables (Z2 and Z3) to help identify our system of 
equations. Shop Certified is a binary variable that describes that the buyer intentionally shopped only for a 
certified used vehicle. Following Wooldridge (2002), we also create cross products of the instruments of 
endogenous interaction terms for additional instruments. We also form interactions with Shop Certified and 
Mileage and Luxury. Further, we use as instruments buyers beliefs regarding certification programs—there is 
                                                 
8 Incidentally, this also addresses the problem of measurement error, if present, since each individual respondent provides multiple 
observations on use of online information, choice of certification, and price paid in our sample. 
9 For comparison, we also estimate several other models: information, certification and price equations separately using probits and 
OLS, and simultaneously using SUR and 2SLS models. However, we only provide the results from the more complete 3SLS model.  
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value in certification, certification programs offer special financing/discounts, and previous experience with 
certified programs. We include a dummy to indicate whether the car the buyer purchase just happened to be 
certified. A set of four variables is used to measure the buyers rating of the importance of each type of 
information on a scale of 1 to 10. Finally, we add an interaction term between time spent on the Internet 
(hours/week) and Shop Certified. This set of instruments is regressed on each of the endogenous variables to 
obtain instrumental variables. 
The relevance of our instruments is confirmed by the significance of the F-test and the partial R2 of the 
included set of instruments when regressed on the endogenous variables. Their validity is assessed as a test of 
the assumption of exogeneity between the set of instruments and the regression error of the outcome equation, 
conducted using tests of overidentification. The Sargan test statistic is not rejected in the model in Table 5, 
reinforcing the validity of our set of instruments and confirming that the set of instruments in each equation 
adequately identify our system of equations. 
Results 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics and Table 4 the correlations among constructs. Table 5 presents the 
main results of our analyses from 3SLS. M1a and M1b provide the coefficients for the estimation of log Price 
and Certification respectively, and M1c—M1f provides the coefficients of the estimation of buyers’ retrieval of 
online information. In the following paragraphs we outline the results relating to the impact of each group of factors 
on the retrieval of online information (models M1c—M1f), choice of certification (denoted by model M1b), followed by 
their impact on price (denoted by model M1a).   
Model Results  
The impacts of Vehicle Characteristics- Mileage, Model year, and 125 make-model dummies (not displayed) 
and vehicle Price are shown in Panel A; effects of Information, Certification and their interactions are in Panel 
B; Buyer demographics and psychographics are in Panel C; and Panel D includes offline information controls10.  
                                                 
10 Other control variables described earlier, are included, but not displayed.  
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Vehicle Characteristics: We find that most vehicle characteristics do not impact buyer’s likelihood of obtaining 
online information. Interestingly though, we find that buyers purchased certification on higher mileage and early 
model (year) cars. As for the impact of vehicle characteristics on price, we find that the average buyer pays 
about $100 less for each additional 1000 miles on the car, and an additional $1098 for newer model cars.  
Certification and Online Information: Our main interest lies in examining the effects of online information on the 
buyer’s value for certification, as indicated by its impact on the likelihood of purchasing a certified used vehicle, 
and the price paid. Certification has a significant positive coefficient on price (supporting H1) indicating that 
buyers pay a premium (of about $1158) for certified vehicles. While certified vehicles are more expensive, the 
average coefficient for certification covers the premium for luxury makes and lower mileage cars. This is 
evidenced in column M1a, where the coefficients of the interaction terms of mileage and luxury with certification 
are insignificant. In other words, after controlling for price in the certification equation, our results indicate that 
consumers do not pay a higher premium for certification on luxury and lower mileage cars. 
With respect to consumers’ choice of certification and price paid for the used vehicle (as shown in Panel B, 
Table 5), we find that online information has a significant impact on a consumer’s likelihood of purchasing a 
certified vehicle. Interestingly, the different categories of information (product and price) affect the choice 
outcome in different ways. Increased retrieval of product-related information such as reliability and features 
information from online sources reduces the likelihood of purchasing a certified vehicle. However, the retrieval 
of transaction price information and comparative price information increases the likelihood of a certified 
purchase. Thus, hypotheses H2a, H3a, H4a, and H5a are supported. With regards to price, we find that product 
and price related information have the opposite effects on price paid. Overall vehicle reliability information is 
found to have a positive impact on price, with consumers paying about $627 more on an average, per unit of 
information obtained. The coefficient on features information, while positive, is however insignificant on price. 
Obtaining transaction information has a negative impact on price of nearly $92 per unit of information, while 
comparative price information reduces price by $208 per unit of information obtained.  
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Note that the coefficients of the interaction between certification and the four online information factors are 
all insignificant in M1a. This captures the marginal effect of online information on the price paid for certification. 
The split sample analysis in Table 6 further highlights the differential impact of online information on price paid 
across the certified and non-certified purchases. The results indicate that for certified cars, online information 
has no direct impact on price paid, indicating that hypotheses H2b-H5b are not supported. For non-certified 
cars, however, online information affects price in the same manner as in the pooled sample. Our results 
highlight that, while online information had no additional impact on price, beyond its impact on choice of 
certification for buyers who purchased certified vehicles; online information had significant (although, varied) 
effects on the price paid for non-certified vehicle purchases. 
Buyer Characteristics: It is also informative to examine what kinds of buyers obtain online information.  In 
panel C (Table 5), we present the results of the post-hoc analysis of buyer characteristics. We find that high 
income buyers obtain significantly more comparative price information, attesting to the fact that they are the 
most likely group to consider buying new vehicles. Minority buyers are less likely to obtain all four types of 
online information. Buyers with low education are less likely to retrieve features, reliability, and comparatives 
information, and older buyers get less features information. Interestingly, gender and marital status play no role 
in differential acquisition of online information, choice of certification or price paid.  With relation to buyer 
experience, those who previously owned used vehicles, obtained significantly less reliability, transaction, and 
comparative information, but are more likely to buy certified vehicles. Buyers who specifically wanted a used 
vehicle obtained more features information, but less comparative price information. Further, they were more 
likely to purchase certification.  
Finally, we briefly consider the impacts of two additional information controls. Offline information search is 
an important option available to buyers, and we find that buyers who used offline classifieds and ads to locate 
their vehicles were also more likely to obtain online information, while buyers who relied on personal offline 
sources were less likely to obtain online information. Both types of offline sources were associated with 
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increased propensity of purchasing certification. However, only information from the latter—personal sources- 
helps to significantly lower the price paid. 
Limitations 
Prior to discussing the implications of our findings it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this work. 
First, we are limited by our reliance on secondary data collected by a third party. However, this detailed data set 
collected by one of the largest market research firms in the US represents one of the most extensive surveys of 
used vehicle buyers and the measures used possess good psychometric properties. Second, there is a 
possibility of common methods bias as the data was collected through a single survey instrument. This is 
mitigated to a large extent by having each response correspond to vehicle registrations and tied objectively to a 
verified purchase. Additionally, we can reject the presence of this bias on the basis of Harman’s single factor 
test (see Podsakoff et al. 2003 for a complete discussion) on the perceptual indicators, where we obtained 
multiple factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, with the largest factor accounting for less than 25% of the 
variance. Third, our method of estimation using 3SLS offers some advantages- as a full-information model, it is 
theoretically more efficient because it uses information in the data more comprehensively. However, it 
potentially suffers from biases arising from model misspecification. To assess robustness, we also additionally 
estimate limited information models such as 2SLS, which do not face the same problem since they ignore 
information about the joint distribution of the error terms across the equations, albeit suffering from a potential 
loss of efficiency, if in fact 3SLS was appropriate. The results of these additional tests are robust to those of the 
3SLS estimation, with no variables changing sign or significance. The consistency of the results across these 
different models reinforces the validity of our findings. Finally, it should be noted that one of our dependent 
variable – certification - is binary. Therefore employing 3SLS may lead to possible biases due to the 
dependency of errors on the coefficients. While there is no easily available technique to estimate structural 
systems of equations with binary endogenous variables, Angrist and Krueger (2001) show that this is not 
necessarily a perilous problem since the consistency of the second-stage or outcome estimates does not 
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depend on getting the functional form of the first-stage or choice equation correct, and therefore linear 
regression is sufficient. In addition, to assess robustness, we also ran our models using probit regressions for 
first-stage choice models as well, and obtain consistent results. 
Discussion 
Implications 
Certified pre-owned programs help manufacturers keep used-car residual values high and create vehicles with 
higher resale values. Certified used cars are also believed to be more profitable to dealers. Consequently, 
manufacturers as well as dealers have a strong incentive to promote certified used cars. As for consumers, 
certification may increase aggregate consumer surplus by increasing the average quality of cars traded in the 
used vehicles market. Certification also expands the market by making luxury brand vehicles affordable to 
consumers that would have otherwise not been able to purchase them. However, since such certification is 
done by the manufacturers/dealers themselves, the value of such certification to consumers has been 
questioned. The presence of alternate mechanisms such as warranties, add to this debate about the value of 
certification in the market for used cars. Our findings show that even after accounting for the impacts of online 
information, and additional warranties, certified cars commanded a premium, suggesting that consumers have 
a positive valuation for certification. The figures in Table 4 highlight significant differences between the 
population of certified vehicles and non-certified ones. For instance, certified vehicles were more likely to be low 
mileage with lower variance in usage (t=7.85, p<0.01), newer model year (t = 6.50, p<0.01), and luxury makes 
(t=8.07, p<0.01). This suggests that consumers might benefit from this selective culling of certified used cars, 
which might be particularly valuable to risk-averse consumers as it allows them to enter the market for used 
vehicles. Thus buyers who might otherwise not consider purchasing a used vehicle might be able to purchase a 
certified used vehicle (Vella 2006)11. We also find that consumers who were more satisfied with their certified 
                                                 
11 The risk aversion may arise due to several factors including from the consumer lacking sufficient knowledge about cars, repair and 
maintenance.  
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vehicle were significantly more likely to recommend their make-model to others (82.25% vs. 72.35%), and 
purchase a new vehicle of same make in the future than others (49.14% vs. 39.83%). In addition, consumers 
who bought certified cars were more likely to return to their dealer for post-purchase services than those who 
didn’t (79.35% vs. 60.12%). These highlight the additional benefits dealers/manufacturers get from certification. 
While certification, as seen above, plays an important role in the used vehicle market, one of the most 
significant developments in auto-retailing has been the dramatic increase in the amount and variety of online 
information available to consumers. For instance, consumers now have easy access to detailed information on 
crash tests from insurance companies, results of dependability surveys done by Consumer Reports, safety and 
reliability information from sites such as www.AutoSafety.org and www.LemonaidCars.com, as well as 
information about the used-car’s history from services like CarFax.com. In addition, online information 
intermediaries such as KBB.com, Edmunds.com, Cars.com, IntelliChoice.com, and AutoTrader.com, among 
others, provide ratings, reviews, rankings on several reliability dimensions, and a plethora of information of 
value to consumers of used cars. However, their impact on consumer behavior and choices has not been 
examined before. We find that, after controlling for detailed vehicle and buyer characteristics, buyer pre-
purchase vehicle consideration sets, as well as offline information sources, buyers’ value for certification is 
significantly impacted by information retrieved from online sources. However, this impact depends on the type 
of information obtained by consumers (see Fig. 1). While information about used vehicle features can help to 
reduce the knowledge uncertainty for consumers seeking used cars, information regarding vehicle reliability/ 
safety including data on vehicle speed, handling, and road performance, can help reduce performance 
uncertainty. We find that these two categories of information – features and reliability information – reduce the 
likelihood of a buyer purchasing a certified used car. In addition, we find that of the two product-related 
information categories, reliability information significantly increases the price paid by consumers purchasing 
non-certified used cars. Thus, from a seller’s perspective reliability information is a stronger substitute to 
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traditional certification, while complementing the sale of non-certified used cars12. On the other hand, 
transaction price related information can serve to reduce the economic/financial uncertainty, while comparative 
information relating to the price of new alternatives can help reduce choice uncertainty as well as economic 
uncertainty about the value of the purchase. In contrast to the impact of product-related information categories, 
we find that transaction and comparative price information - are complementary to the purchase of certification, 
while reducing the price paid by consumers purchasing non-certified used car purchases.  
 Features 
Information 
Transaction 
Information 
Reliability 
Information 
Comparative 
Information 
Certification 
Choice – + – + 
Non-Certified 
Price 
      + (N.S.) – + – 
Fig 1: Impact of Online Information on Choice of Certification and Price of Used Cars 
These findings have significant implications for dealers of used cars. Given that used cars are twice as 
profitable for dealers as new vehicles (CIRP 2007), understanding the impact of the Internet on consumer 
outcomes becomes paramount. Price-related information not only increases a consumer’s likelihood of 
purchasing a certified used car but also decreases the price paid for consumers purchasing non-certified used 
cars. Product-related information has the exact opposite impact on consumers’ choices (and consequently the 
sellers’ demand) and price. Understanding the differential impacts of these information categories on consumer 
choice and price outcomes is crucial for traditional dealers. Sellers of certified used cars would benefit from 
providing consumers with easier and inexpensive access to price and transaction related information, while  
sellers of non-certified used cars would benefit from providing consumers with greater access to information 
about product features and reliability.  
                                                 
12 It is pertinent to note that since our dataset consists of only two categories of used cars – certified and non-certified used cars - 
information that decreases the likelihood of a certified purchase increases the likelihood of a non-certified purchase. 
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Our findings also have implications for the strategic partnerships between traditional dealers and online 
information providers. Since online information providers vary in the type of information they provide, partnering 
with the right online information providers would be mutually beneficial to dealers as well as online 
infomediaries. For instance, dealers of certified used cars would benefit from affiliations with online 
infomediaries such as Capital One Auto Finance, and E-loans.com that provide transaction information. In 
addition, they would also benefit from partnering with online sites that provide information on both used and 
new vehicles. As indicated by our results, buyers who obtained comparative information on new car alternatives 
were more likely to purchase certification, highlighting the interrelationships between new and certified-used car 
sales. Alternatively, dealers selling non-certified used cars (for instance, dealers of non-luxury and high-mileage 
used cars), as well as consumers would benefit from dealers’ affiliation with online infomediaries such as 
AutoSafety.org, LemonaidCars.com, and CarFax.com that provide reliability and safety information that serve 
as a substitute to certification but complement non-certified used car purchases. Identifying the right online 
information partners would not only help traditional dealers target the right customer segments but also 
optimize their inventory of certified and non-certified used cars. Concomitantly, online infomediaries would also 
benefit by better highlighting the value of their information in reducing asymmetries in such markets.  
Our findings relating to buyer characteristics and their likelihood of obtaining online information have some 
interesting implications. A recent survey conducted by Automotive Retailing Today, a coalition of automakers 
and dealers whose stated goal is to narrow the gap between media accounts of dealership conditions and 
consumers' experiences, finds that the majority of the minority buyers that were surveyed said that their 
dealership did not give them enough information to make an informed purchase, and that the dealerships often 
did not honor their commitments (Harris 2005). Our results indicate that minorities as well as less-educated 
consumers are also less likely to obtain the various categories of online information prior to their purchase. This 
has important implications for their welfare, as these are typically the consumers who tend to be discriminated 
against by traditional dealers as evidence by past research findings (Ayres and Seigelman 1995; Scott-Morton, 
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Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2003). Online information intermediaries can add greater value to these 
consumers who are more prone to discrimination in traditional channels. Currently, “the “Car Buyer’s Bill of 
Rights” forces dealers to reveal vehicle history along with a copy of the inspection report when selling certified 
used vehicles and provide a two-day sales contract cancellation policy” (CIRP, 2007). However, our findings 
suggest the need for stronger public policy measures to ensure greater transparency in transactions with 
“disadvantaged consumers”. 
Our findings relating to the impact of online information on price of used cars also extend the earlier 
findings. For instance, Zettelmeyer et al. (2005, 2006), find that online buyers paid on an average about 2% 
less than offline buyers. In our study, by teasing out different types of online information sought by used vehicle 
buyers, we obtain more nuanced effects of online channel use. Another interesting finding relates to 
consumers’ use of online and offline sources of information. We find that while impersonal/ commercial sources 
of offline information (for e.g., classifieds in TV/magazines/radio) complement online information search, both 
prior experiences as well as the use of personal information sources (for e.g., friends and relatives) serves as a 
substitute to online information search in the context for used cars – a likely indication of the importance of trust 
in the decision to purchase used goods. This suggests that dealers of used goods might benefit from cost-
effective alternate quality signals such as reputation mechanisms and ratings from earlier transactions to 
engender greater trust in consumers.  
Conclusion 
Secondary markets are an important part of the economy and have been growing rapidly in many product 
categories. Clearly, secondary markets are an important category for vehicle manufacturers and play an 
important role in the demand as well as the profitability of new cars for manufacturers, as well as dealers. The 
rapid growth of the Internet and online information sources has dramatically changed the balance of power 
between consumers and car dealers. While earlier studies have examined the impact of the Internet on the 
market for new cars, there have been very few studies of secondary markets in general, and more specifically 
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the impact of the Internet on the market for used cars. Our study is among the first to examine the impact of 
different types of online information on the market for used cars. In addition, we focus on the impact of such 
information on consumers’ value for certification for used cars. Our study highlights interesting relationships 
between different types of online information and consumers’ value for certification. Our findings relating to the 
impact of various information categories highlight the need to disentangle these effects empirically to better 
understand their differential impacts on the outcomes of interest to buyers and sellers. In general, our findings 
about the impact of the different types of online information on consumer demand for traditional quality signals 
and price outcomes provide useful guidelines for other secondary markets. 
While the primary focus of this study has been on impact of online information on certification in the market 
for used cars, other mechanisms such as seller quality, warranties, product guarantees, branding, etc. also 
serve to reduce information asymmetries in many markets. It would be useful to examine the impact of the 
increased availability of online information on alternate quality signaling mechanisms.  In addition, while this 
study examines the impact of information on consumer choices in a classic lemons market, it would be 
interesting to study the impact of such information on the quality signaling mechanisms in online secondary 
markets such as EBay and Amazon, which have gained prominence. 
References 
Akerlof, George A. (1970), “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. 
Alba, Joseph, Joseph Alba, John Lynch, Barton Weitz, Chris Janiszewski, Richard Lutz, Alan Sawyer, and 
Stacy Wood (1997), “Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer, and Manufacturer Incentives to 
Participate in Electronic Marketplaces,” Journal of Marketing, 61(July), 38-53. 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Krueger (2001), “Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From 
Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 69-85. 
Ayres, Ian and Peter Siegelman (1995), “Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,” 
American Economic Review, 85(3), 304-322. 
 27
Baye, Michael R. and John Morgan (2001), “Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness 
of Homogeneous Product Markets,” American Economic Review, 91(3), 454-474 
Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2003), “The Value of Information in an Online Consumer 
Electronics Market”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 22(1), 17-25. 
Beatty, S. E. and Smith, S. M. (1987), “External search Effort: An Investigation Across Several Product 
categories,” Journal of Consumer Research, 14(June), 83-95. 
Brown, Jeffrey R. and Austan Goolsbee (2002), “Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence 
from the Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(3), 481-507. 
Chaudhuri, Arjun (2000), “A Macro Analysis of the Relationship Between Product Involvement and Information 
Search: The Role of Risk, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, Winter 2000, 1-15. 
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and V. Padmanabhan (2002), “Referal Informediaries,” Marketing Science, 21(4), 
412-434. 
CIRP (2007). “The Anatomy and Physiology of the Used Car Business”. Research Report. Car Internet 
Research Program II. 
Cutler, Kim-Mai. (2005), “Certified Used Cars Come Under Fire: Wave of Lawsuits Claim Widely Offered 
 Guarantees Fail to Disclose Past Problems,” The Wall Street Journal (July 12). 
Cox, D. F. (1967), Risk taking and information handling in consumer behavior, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Dewally, Michael and Louis Ederington (2006), “Reputation, Certification, Warranties, and Information as 
Remedies for Seller-Buyer Information Asymmetries: Lessons from the Online Comic Book Market,” 
Journal of Business, 79, 693-729. 
Dewan, Sanjeev and Vernon Hsu (2004), “Adverse Selection in Electronic Markets: Evidence from Online 
Stamp Auctions,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(4), 463-590. 
Diehl, Kristin, Laura J. Kornish and John G. Lynch, Jr. (2003), “Smart Agents: When Lower Search Costs for 
Quality Information Increase Price Sensitivity,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30(1), 56–71 
Dowling, Grahame R. and Staelin, Richard (1994), “ A Model of Perceived Risk and Intended Risk-Handling 
Activity,” Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1), 119-134. 
Folta, Timothy B. and Jay J. Janney (2004), “Strategic benefits to firms issuing private equity placements,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(3), 223-242. 
Furse, D. H., G. H. Punj, and D. W. Stewart (1984), “A Typology of Individual Search Strategies Among 
Purchasers of New Automobiles,” Journal of Consumer Research, 10(March), 417-431. 
 28
Gabbott, Mark (1991), “The Role of Product Cues in Assessing Risk in Second-hand Markets,” European 
Journal of Marketing, 25(9), 38-50. 
Gereffi, Gary, Ronie Garcia-Johnson and Erika Sasser (2001), “The NGO-Industrial Complex,” Foreign Policy, 
125, 56-66.  
Ginter, James L., Murray A. Young and Peter R. Dickson (1987), “A Market Efficiency Study of Used Car 
Reliability and Prices,” The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 21(2), 258-276. 
Greene, William (2003), Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition, Prentice Hall. 
Harris, Donna (2005). “Poll: Buyers are unhappy with dealers,” Automotive News, 79, (January 31).  
Heckman, James (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,” Econometrica, 47(1), 153-161. 
Hodkinson, Christopher and Geoffrey Keil (2003), “Understanding Web Information Search Behavior: An 
Exploratory Model,” Journal of End User Computing, 15(4), 27-48. 
Ippolito, Pauline M. and Alan D. Mathios (1990), “Information, Advertising and Health Choices,” RAND Journal 
of Economics, 21(3), 459-480.  
J. D. Power and Associates (2005), Internet Overtakes Print Advertising as Primary Shopping Source for Used 
Vehicles. Management Research Report (June 16). Accessed at 
http://www.jdpower.com/corporate/news/releases/pressrelease.asp?ID=2005080 
J. D. Power and Associates (2006), Autoshopper.com Study:. Online Used-Vehicle Classifieds Outpace Print 
Ads Two to One (May 25). Accessed at 
http://www.jdpower.com/corporate/news/releases/pressrelease.asp?ID=2006076  
Jin, Ginger Z. and Andrew Kato (Forthcoming), “Price, Quality and Reputation: Evidence from an Online Field 
Experiment,” RAND Journal of Economics. 
Jin, Ginger Z. and Phillip Leslie (2003), “The Effects of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 409-451. 
Jin, Ginger Z., Andrew Kato and John A. List (2006), “That’s News to Me! Information Revelation in 
Professional Certification Markets,” Working Paper, University of Maryland, College Park.  
Johnson, Eric J., Wendy W. Moe, Peter S> Fader, Steven Bellman, Gerald L. Lohse (2004), “On the Depth and 
Dynamics of Online Search Behaviors,” Management Science, 50(3), 299-308. 
Kaplan, Leon B., George J. Szybillo, and Jacob Jacoby (1974), “Components of Perceived Risk in Product 
Purchase: A Cross-Validation,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 59(3), 287-291. 
Keil, Geoffrey C., and Roger A. Layton (1981), “Dimensions of Consumer Information Seeking Behavior,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 18(May), 233-239. 
 29
Klein, Lisa R. and Gary T. Ford (2003), “Consumer Search for Information in the Digital Age: An Empirical 
Study of Prepurchase Search for Automobiles,” Journal of Interactive Marketing, 17(3), 29-49. 
Kleiner, Morris M., and Robert T. Kudrle (2000), “Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of 
Dentistry,” Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2), 547-582. 
Lizzeri, Alessandro (1999), “Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 30(2) 214-231. 
Lynch, Jr. John. G., and Dan Ariely (2000), “Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality 
and Distribution,” Marketing Science, 19(1), 83-104. 
Maddala, G. S. (1983), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Moorman, Christine, Kristin Diehl, David Brinberg, and Blair Kidwell (2004), “Subjective Knowledge, Search 
Locations, and Consumer Choice,” Journal of Consumer Research, 31(3), 673-680.  
Moorthy, Sridhar, Brian T. Ratchford, and Debabrata Talukdar (1997), “Consumer Information Search 
Revisited: Theory and Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Consumer Research, 23(4), 263-277. 
Podsakoff, Phillip M., Scott B. Mackenzie, Jeong-Yeon Lee, and Nathan P. Podsakoff (2003), “Common 
Methods Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879-903. 
Pratt, Michael D. and George E. Hoffer (1985), “State Used Motor Vehicle Disclosure Laws: Do They Make a 
Difference to the Consumer?” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 19(1), 177-185. 
Punj, Girish N., and Staelin, Richard. (1983), “A Model of Consumer Information Search Behavior for New 
Automobiles,” Journal of Consumer Research, 9(March), 366-380 
Purohit, Devavrat and Joydeep Srivastava (2001), “Effect of Manufacturer Reputation, Retailer Reputation, and 
Product Warranty on Consumer Judgments of Product Quality: A Cue Diagnosticity Framework,” Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 10(3), 123-134. 
Ratchford, Brian T., Debabrata Talukdar and Myung-Soo Lee (2001), “A Model of Consumer Choice of the 
Internet as an Information Source,” International  Journal of Electronic Commerce, 40(2), 193-209. 
Ratchford, Brian T., Myung-Soo Lee, and Debabrata Talukdar (2003), “The Impact of the Internet on 
Information Search for Automobiles,” Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2), 193-209. 
Ratchford, Brian T., Myung-Soo Lee, and Debabrata Talukdar (2007), “The Impact of the Internet on 
Information Search for Automobiles: A Re-Inquiry,” Journal of Consumer Research, 34(1), 111-119. 
 30
Resnick, Paul, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson, and Kate Lockwood (2006), “The Value of Reputation on 
eBay: A Controlled Experiment,” Experimental Economics, 9(2), 79-101. 
Schmidt, J. B. and R. A. Spreng (1966), “A Proposed Model of External Consumer Information Search,” Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 24(3), 246-256. 
Scott-Morton, Fiona, Florian Zettelmeyer and Jorge Silva-Risso (2003), “Consumer Information and Price 
Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?” Quantitative 
Marketing and Economics, 1(1), 65–92. 
Smith, Michael D. and Erik Brynjolfsson (2001), “Consumer Decision-Making at an Internet Shopbot: Brand Still 
Matters,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(4), 541-558. 
Srinivasan, Narasimhan and Brian T. Ratchford (1991), “An Empirical Test of a Model of External Search for 
Automobiles,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18(September), 233-242. 
Terlaak, Ann and Andrew A. King (2006), “The effect of certification with the ISO 9000 Quality Management 
Standard: A signaling approach,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(4), 579-602. 
Tirole, Jean (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
Urbany, Joel. E., P. R. Dickson, and W. L. Wilkie (1989), “Buyer uncertainty and information search,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 16, 208–215. 
Vella, Matt (2006), Best Used Cars. Business Week Online (July 6). 
Viswanathan, Siva, Jason N. Kuruzovich, Sanjay Gosain, and Ritu Agarwal (2007), “Online Infomediaries and 
Price Discrimination: Evidence from the Auto-Retailing Sector,” Journal of Marketing, 71(3), 98-107. 
Wimmer, Bradley S., and Brian Chezum (2003), “An Empirical Examination of Quality Certification in a Lemons 
Market,” Economic Inquiry, 41(2), 279-291. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press. 
Zettelmeyer, Florian, Fiona Scott Morton, and Jorge Silva-Risso (2005), “Cowboys or Cowards: Why Are 
Internet Car Prices Lower?” Discussion paper, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. 
Zettelmeyer, Florian, Fiona Scott Morton, Jorge Silva-Risso (2006), “How the Internet Lowers Prices: Evidence 
from Matched Survey and Auto Transaction Data,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43(2), 168-181. 
 31
Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Operationalization of Constructs 
 
Construct Operationalization 
Vehicle Price Total Price in $ (excl. tax, license, trade-in) 
Model Year Vehicle Model Year (1999 upto 2004) with base year 1998 
Income 15 point scale (0 – Less than $25K; 15 - More than $250K) 
Minority Race 1 – If African American or Hispanic; 0 – Otherwise 
Low Education 1 – If less than a high school graduate, 0 – If more educated 
Gender  1 – Male; 0 – Female 
Age Age in Years 
Married Whether married or not 
Previous car was used 1 – Has previously owned a used car; 0- otherwise 
Want Used  1 – Intended to purchase used vehicle; 0 – otherwise 
Certified Vehicle 1 – Purchased certified vehicle; 0 – Otherwise 
Mileage  Miles at Purchase /1000 
Luxury Make 1 – If Luxury nameplate; 0 – Otherwise 
Features Information FEAT Average of 3 items corresponding to online information search on a scale of 0-1 
Reliability Information RELB Average of 4 items corresponding to online information search on a scale of 0-1 
Transaction Information TRAN Average of 4 items corresponding to online information search on a scale of 0-1 
Comparatives Information COMP Average of 3 items corresponding to online information search on a scale of 0-1 
Visit Online Before Dealer 1 - conducted online search prior to visiting dealers; 0- otherwise 
Use offline classifieds/ads Average of 2 items corresponding to offline classifieds/ads used to locate and research vehicle 0-1 
Use offline personal sources Average of 2 items corresponding to prior experience and recommendations from friends/relatives used 
to locate and research vehicle 0-1 
Additional Warranty 1 – Purchase additional warranty; 0 – Otherwise 
Satisfaction with vehicle overall quality (Rating) 10 point scale for overall rating of vehicle 
Post-Purchase Defects Number of problems encountered with vehicle after purchase 
Market location Dummies for Rural, small, metro 
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Table 2 
Factors for Online Information Search 
 
Please tell us whether you found this information while searching on the Internet (Yes/ No) 
 
Information Found While Searching Online F1:Features F2:Reliability F3:Transaction F4:Comparatives 
Used vehicle photographs 0.7113 0.2042 0.1424 0.0422 
Locate used vehicles for sale 0.6901 0.0658 0.2290 -0.0005 
Options and features available on used vehicles 0.6044 0.3672 0.1632 0.1405 
Road tests/articles about vehicles 0.1165 0.8192 0.0961 0.1084 
Performance data on vehicles (speed, handling, etc.) 0.1924 0.7957 0.1107 0.1033 
Vehicle reliability information 0.0370 0.7539 0.1260 0.1887 
Safety information 0.1291 0.7274 0.2315 0.0519 
Special financing/discount offers 0.0909 0.1186 0.7648 0.2008 
Service contract/extended warranty information 0.0499 0.1845 0.7296 0.1142 
Information on certified used vehicles 0.1971 0.2197 0.6811 0.0232 
Tool for calculating monthly payments 0.2851 0.1220 0.5289 0.1916 
Dealer cost/invoice of new vehicles -0.0255 0.1522 0.3027 0.7229 
Prices of new vehicles 0.2890 0.1360 0.0786 0.6823 
Trade-in values 0.0636 0.3045 0.1161 0.5580 
Factor Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) 0.68 0.83 0.72 0.59 
F1:Features 1.00 0.3922*** .3431*** 0.3657*** 
F2:Reliability  1.00 0.3646*** 0.3824*** 
F3:Transaction   1.00 0.3510*** 
F4:Comparatives    1.00 
Notes: *** indicates correlation significance at p<0.01 level 
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Table 3 
Split sample t-tests 
Variables Non-Certified Vehicles (N =2597)  Certified Vehicles (N = 1226) t- Statistics (df = 3821) 
Vehicle Characteristics 
Price paid ($1000) 14.57 (7.44) 17.37 (7.90)  t = -11.5917(p = 0.00) 
Miles on Vehicle (000’s) 36.65 (21.67) 31.08 (17.60) t = 7.8508 (p = 0.00) 
Luxury Import 0.21 (0.41) 0.33 (0.47) t = -8.0673 (p = 0.00) 
Model year 2.78 (1.34) 3.08 (1.32) t = -6.5015 (p = 0.00) 
Consumer Demographics 
Age 47.40 (14.85) 49.65 (14.87) t= -4.3681 (p = 0.00) 
Gender 0.59 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) t= 2.3572 (p = 0.02) 
Low Education 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) t = 0.5665 (p = 0.57) 
Income 6.05 (3.42) 6.33 (3.50) t =  -2.4043 (p = 0.02)  
Minority Race 0.07 (0.25) 0.10 (0.30) t = -3.3595 (p = 0.00) 
Married 0.70 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) t = -0.0775 (p = 0.94) 
Consumer Experience/ Psychographics 
   Previous car was used 0.62 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) t = 2.2656 (p = 0.02) 
   Want Used vehicle 0.65 (0.48) 0.58 (0.49) t = 4.1669 (p = 0.00) 
Online Information  
Reliability Information  0.35 (0.40) 0.39 (0.41) t = -2.5240 (p = 0.01) 
Features Information 0.47 (0.45) 0.49 (0.44) t = -1.6974 (p = 0.09) 
Transaction Information 0.18 (0.28) 0.24 (0.32) t = -5.8493 (p = 0.00) 
Comparatives Information 0.36 (0.39) 0.40 (0.40) t = -2.6801 (p = 0.01) 
Controls    
Offline Classifieds/ads 0.55 (1.19) 0.50 (1.15) t = 1.4752 (p = 0.00) 
Offline Personal 0.34 (1.31) 0.30 (1.25) t = 1.1291 (p = 0.00) 
Bought from rural market 0.41 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47) t = 4.5940 (p = 0.00) 
Bought from small market 0.43 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) t = -3.0551 (p = 0.00) 
Bought from new vehicle seller 0.57 (0.50) 0.77 (0.42) t = -14.1365 (p = 0.00) 
Bought from used vehicle seller 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) t = 7.6818 (p = 0.00)  
Additional warranty 0.22 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46) t = -6.7980 (p = 0.00) 
Notes: * p <.10,   ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; unpaired sample t-tests. Standard error of mean deviation shown in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Correlations (N = 3823) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Price (1000) 15.57 7.77 1.00                 
2 Miles 34.42 20.38 -0.34 
*** 
1.00                
3 Model year 2.90 1.35 0.22 
*** 
-0.60 
*** 
1.00               
4 Luxury 0.25 0.43 0.61 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
-0.11 
*** 
1.00              
5 Income 6.10 3.46 0.33 
*** 
-0.10 
*** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.39 
*** 
1.00             
6 Minority 0.08 0.27 -0.00 0.04 
*** 
-0.02 
* 
0.01 -0.07 
*** 
1.00            
7 Education 
(Low) 
0.24 0.43 -0.12 
*** 
0.03 
** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.17 
*** 
-0.26 
*** 
-0.00 1.00           
8 Gender 
(Male) 
0.57 0.49 0.09 
*** 
0.02 -0.04 
** 
0.10 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
1.00          
9 Age 48.91 14.96 0.13 
*** 
-0.16 
*** 
0.20 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
-0.01 -0.09 
*** 
0.16 
*** 
0.19 
*** 
1.00         
10 Married 0.67 0.47 0.04 
*** 
0.00 -0.01 0.06 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
0.05 
*** 
0.25 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
1.00        
11 Previous 
Car Used  
0.57 0.49 -0.11 
*** 
0.11 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.11 
*** 
-0.01 0.07 
*** 
0.01 -0.09 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
1.00       
12 Want Used 0.63 0.48 -0.18 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
-0.21 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
-0.01 -0.06 
*** 
0.01 0.06 
*** 
0.05 
*** 
0.05 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
1.00      
13 Certified 0.33 0.47 0.17 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
0.10 
*** 
0.13 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.01 -0.05 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
-0.02 -0.05 
*** 
-
0.07*** 
1.00     
14 FEAT 0.46 0.44 0.12 
*** 
0.01 -0.13 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.23 
*** 
-0.03 
** 
-0.23 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
-0.25 
*** 
0.03 
** 
-0.04 
*** 
0.00 0.01 1.00    
15 RELB 
 
0.35 0.40 0.11 
*** 
0.01 -0.10 
*** 
0.18 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
-0.03 
** 
-0.21 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.20 
*** 
0.03 
** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
0.02 0.81 
*** 
1.00   
16 TRANS 
 
0.19 0.29 0.10 
*** 
-0.00 -0.07 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.16 
*** 
-0.02 -0.15 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
-0.15 
*** 
0.03 
** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.04 
** 
0.07 
*** 
0.64 
*** 
0.63 
*** 
1.00  
17 COMP 
 
0.37 0.39 0.13 
*** 
-0.01 -0.09 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.23 
*** 
-0.04 
** 
-0.21 
*** 
0.08 
*** 
-0.20 
*** 
0.04 
** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.05 
*** 
0.02 
* 
0.84 
*** 
0.77 
*** 
0.64 
*** 
1.00 
Notes: * p <.10,   ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; unpaired sample t-tests.
 Table 5. 
Model Estimation Results for Full sample using 3SLS 
 
 M1a.  
PRICE 
M1b.  
CERTI 
M1c.  
FEAT 
M1d.  
RELB 
M1e.  
TRAN 
M1f.  
COMP 
A. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Miles -0.005 0.035 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Model Year 0.094 -0.625 -0.009 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.005)*** (0.078)*** (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Price (Ln)  6.475     
  (0.705)***     
B. CERTIFICATION AND ONLINE INFORMATION 
Certified 0.147      
 (0.019)***      
Certified * Miles 0.000      
 (0.003)      
Certified * Luxury 0.009      
 (0.136)      
Features Information (FEAT) 0.071 -3.800     
 (0.275) (0.893)***     
Reliability Information (RELB) 0.920 -8.715     
 (0.409)** (1.125)***     
Transaction Information (TRAN) -0.964 10.285     
 (0.352)*** (0.835)***     
Comparatives Information (COMP) -0.468 7.903     
 (0.282)* (1.296)***     
FEAT * Certified -0.023      
 (0.640)      
RELB * Certified -0.023      
 (0.639)      
TRAN * Certified 0.038      
 (0.779)      
COMP * Certified 0.028      
 (0.391)      
C. BUYER DEMOGRAPHICS AND PSYCHOGRAPHICS 
Income -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)** 
Minority -0.005 0.221 -0.060 -0.054 -0.041 -0.076 
 (0.017) (0.135) (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.016)** (0.018)*** 
Low education 0.020 -0.195 -0.061 -0.055 -0.015 -0.047 
 (0.011)* (0.089)** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.010) (0.012)*** 
Gender (male) 0.000 -0.060 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.020 0.120 -0.009 -0.009 0.002 -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.088) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Previous Car Used -0.012 0.176 -0.007 -0.022 -0.018 -0.022 
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 (0.012) (0.074)** (0.010) (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.010)** 
Want Used -0.023 0.327 0.021 -0.016 -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.012)* (0.087)*** (0.010)** (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)** 
D. CONTROLS: OFFLINE INFORMATION SEARCH$ 
Use of offline classifieds -0.008 0.076 0.061 0.038 0.025 0.037 
 (0.005) (0.033)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Use of offline personal source -0.016 0.120 -0.033 -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.004)*** (0.028)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
 
Constant 3.249 -20.595 -0.105 -0.087 -0.000 -0.211 
 (0.079)*** (2.398)*** (0.078) (0.084) (0.071) (0.080)*** 
Observations 3823 3823 3823 3823 3823 3823 
Fit statistics R2 = 0.60 R2 = 0.13 R2 = 0.62 R2 = 0.47 R2 = 0.28 R2 = 0.49 
Notes: $ All models contain 125 car dummies for vehicle make-model-trim. Additional controls (not shown) for the price model M1a and 
choice of certification model M1b are market area (rural, small, metro), vehicle quality/condition (Satisfaction and NumProblems), purchase of 
additional warranty, and type of seller (new vehicle, used vehicle, other dealer). Other information controls include order of online search 
compared to dealer visits, and consumer psychographics. 
All variables in panel B are modeled as endogenous and estimated using the instrumental variables technique with a surfeit of 
instruments.  
* p <.10,   ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6. 
Model Estimation Results for Split sample using 3SLS 
DV: Price 
 Certified sample Non-certified sample 
A. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Miles -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Model Year 0.090 0.097 
 (0.007)*** (0.005)*** 
Price (Ln)   
   
B. CERTIFICATION AND ONLINE INFORMATION 
Features Information (FEAT) -0.201 0.077 
 (0.132) (0.132) 
Reliability Information (RELB) -0.081 0.464 
 (0.137) (0.171)*** 
Transaction Information (TRAN) 0.093 -0.593 
 (0.142) (0.163)*** 
Compataives Information (COMP) 0.264 -0.309 
 (0.209) (0.159)* 
C. BUYER CHARACTERISTICS 
Income -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)* 
Minority 0.048 -0.003 
 (0.020)** (0.019) 
Low education -0.008 0.007 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
Gender (male) -0.039 -0.007 
 (0.014)*** (0.010) 
Age -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.029 -0.013 
 (0.014)** (0.012) 
Previous Car Used 0.005  -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Want Used -0.014 -0.029 
 (0.013) (0.012)** 
Observations 1226 2597 
Fit statistics R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.72 
Notes: $ All models contain 125 car dummies for vehicle make-model-trim. Additional controls not shown include order of online 
search compared to dealer visits, use of offline classifieds and offline personal sources, market area (rural, small, metro), vehicle 
quality/condition (Satisfaction and NumProblems), purchase of additional warranty, and type of seller (new vehicle, used vehicle, 
other dealer).  
All variables in panel B are modeled as endogenous and estimated using the instrumental variables technique with a surfeit of 
instruments.  
* p <.10,   ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
 
